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ABSTRACT 
The imposition of government mandates upon Internet search en- 
gine operation is a growing area of interest for both computer sci- 
ence and public policy. Users of these search engines often observe 
evidence of censorship, but the government policies that impose 
this censorship are not generally public. To better understand these 
policies, we conducted a set of experiments on major search en- 
gines employed by Internet users in China, issuing queries against a 
variety of different words: some neutral, some with names of im- 
portant people, some political, and some pornographic.  We con- 
ducted these queries, in Chinese, against Baidu, Google (including 
google.cn, before it was terminated), Yahoo!, and Bing. We found 
remarkably aggressive filtering of pornographic terms, in some cases 
causing non-pornographic terms which use common characters to 
also be filtered.  We also found that names of prominent activists 
and organizers as well as top political and military leaders, were 
also filtered in whole or in part.  In some cases, we found search 
terms which we believe to be “blacklisted”. In these cases, the only 
results that appeared, for any of them, came from a short “whitelist” 
of sites owned or controlled directly by the Chinese government. 
By repeating observations over a long observation period, we also 
found that the keyword blocking policies of the Great Firewall of 
China vary over time. While our results don’t offer any fundamental 
insight into how to defeat or work around Chinese internet censor- 
ship, they are still helpful to understand the structure of how cen- 
sorship duties are shared between the Great Firewall and Chinese 
search engines. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Latest in a line of electronic communications technologies whose 
history reaches back to the mid-19th century, the Internet is revo- 
lutionary in its capacity to permit many-to-many communications 
across global span at enormously low cost. It is also widely consid- 
ered an open system or commons and many in the West opine that 
an electronic extension of the free speech and press endorsed in the 
United States and Western democracies may be applied to it. For 
countries where government oversees media activity, including in 
the digital domain, the free and unfiltered flow of ideas is consid- 
ered undesirable; these governments take technical steps to block 
this undesired Internet content by policy and by technical means. 
Our work is interested in quantifying the degree to which Internet 
search results are filtered in these countries. Internet search engines 
heavily influence how Internet users locate and view content [11]. 
High ranking in search results pages heavily influences which web 
pages are visited and also carries something of an imprimatur of 
importance. If a page ranks highly, it may be a best fit for the de- 
sired knowledge (i.e., it has high page rank [4, 24]), however, search 
ranking algorithms may not be faithful to the intention of the user’s 
search [16], whether due to deliberate search engine manipulation 
by independent “optimizers” (e.g., some web sites’ rankings are ar- 
tificially inflated through the an array of false links from bogus web 
pages on other sites) or due to political pressure from the govern- 
ment for a web search vendor to tamper with their natural results. 
For this reason, we approached the research question of how one 
country, China, exerts its influence upon companies providing In- 
ternet search services for the Chinese market, both from within and 
externally. We want to know how these search engines exercised 
censorship or filtering in providing search results to the Chinese 
people. In this paper, we will describe a variety of different exper- 
imental methods that we devised to better understand these search 
engines’ behaviors. 
Legal frameworks and search censorship.  The choice as to what 
a search engine should or should not elide from its “natural” search 
results is grounded in law, custom and other mores. Questions of 
indecency, illegality and inappropriateness vary across cultures and 
international boundaries. Even among the legally-harmonized na- 
tions of the European Union, restrictions on content, for instance 
Germany’s prohibition of neo-Nazi speech, are permitted. There is 
no universal maxim for free speech on the Internet, however, some 
countries are more permissive of broad unfiltered access than oth- 
ers. 
As the early 2011 political upheaval in the Middle East indicates, 
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Internet connectivity can be a threat to regimes whose political sys- 
tems balance on the controlled delivery of tailored propaganda by 
the political leadership. As a result, governments concerned with 
controlling the message have been increasingly drawn to technolo- 
gies blocking unwelcome concepts, ideas or images from their cit- 
izens [39].  In many countries around the globe, control of infor- 
mation has extended from the traditional management of state-run 
news and media to newer active measures undertaken to remove 
or filter Internet information objectionable to the regime from pub- 
lic purview by technical means. Perhaps no country on the planet 
has taken greater action on this front than China. This is fodder for 
political debate and also serves as our core technological research 
challenge. 
Whereas other nations have, at time of political trouble, chose 
to disconnect from the Internet, as Egypt did after the January 25 
protests reached their peak, or in Burma during the abortive Saf- 
fron Revolution of 2007, China has rapidly grown its Internet user 
population without disconnecting from the world. As of 2010, the 
total number of Internet users in China reached 457 million, more 
than a third of the country, and representing an increase of 34.3% 
from the previous year [5]. The Ministry of Information Industry is 
responsible for the governance of China’s rapidly growing Internet 
ecosystem in partnership with the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
via the China Internet Network Information Center, established in 
1997. 
In its period of exponential user base growth, rather than phys- 
ically walling off its citizens from the Internet as other countries 
have done, China has attempted to temper the benefits of a generally 
open Internet with a variety of censorship tactics [20]. One group of 
researchers called it “a panopticon that encourages self-censorship 
through the perception that users are being watched” [28].China has 
invested heavily in a mix of Internet filtering technologies, network 
police surveillance, and restrictive regulations. All of these serve 
to tightly control access to undesirable Internet content. 
From the beginning of widespread Internet adoption, the Chi- 
nese government has maintained a gap between its domestic in- 
ternet space and the global internet [26]. Internet content filtering 
in China is clearly predicated in policy. Promulgated by the Min- 
istry of Public Security in 1997, the China’s Computer Information 
Network and Internet Security, in its Protection and Management 
Regulations, sets clear rules on the use of information.  In addi- 
tion, any citizen’s use of computer networks is prohibited without 
prior approval. This policy provides the basis for the Golden Shield 
Project, China’s national Internet firewall, colloquially called the 
“Great Firewall of China,” and the recent Green Dam Youth Es- 
cort, reputedly an anti-pornography filter, required for installation 
on public-use computers in China. 
Many countries use one or more of three censorship methods. 
The first of these is an infrastructure-dependent method to filter 
or block content and is made up of blacklists or other dynamic 
systems [6, 7, 25, 8, 35, 10].  The second is a user-focused ap- 
proach whereby cyber police “maintain order in all online behav- 
iors” [29] and functionaries called “Internet commentators” surrep- 
titiously shape public opinion [36]. The third is company-oriented 
and is demonstrated through pressure to self-censor. Through strict 
regulations, the Chinese government imposes its will on Internet 
service providers, blogging sites, search engines, and others that 
stray from the dictated conventions.  We have chosen to examine 
how that will may be impacting search engine operations. 
Contributions of this paper  This paper quantifies Chinese search 
engines’ self-censorship, comparing search results from 8 different 
search engines, crawling more than 45,000 keywords over a period 
of 16 months. These data allow us to ask several interesting ques- 
tions. 
 
• How does the Chinese government control or regulate do- 
mestic search engines? 
• Do all search engines follow the same filtering policies? 
• Is it possible that users know if the search engines they are 
using are practicing self-censorship? 
• Are there easy workarounds for users to gain search results 
that have not been subject to the same degree of filtering? 
 
2.   CHINESE WRITING, IN BRIEF 
To help non-Chinese readers of this paper, we now summarize 
several salient features of Chinese languages and how search en- 
gines must deal with their peculiarities. 
About one-fifth of the world’s population, or over one billion peo- 
ple, speak some form of Chinese as their native language. “Stan- 
dard Chinese” is essentially the Mandarin Chinese dialect spoken 
natively in Beijing.  Other cities speak very different dialects and 
two Chinese speakers from different cities may be completely un- 
able to understand one another.  Even with the broad diversity of 
spoken Chinese, written Chinese is essentially standardized. Most 
Chinese people who cannot speak to one another can still commu- 
nicate in writing. 
There are currently two systems for Chinese writing. The tradi- 
tional system is used mostly in Chinese speaking communities out- 
side mainland China. The traditional system descents from charac- 
ter forms dating back to the 5th century AD. Some traditional Chi- 
nese characters, or derivatives of them, are also found in Korean 
and Japanese writing. The simplified system, introduced in China 
in 1950s with the intent of promoting mass literacy, replaced most 
complex traditional glyphs with newer glyphs having fewer strokes. 
Simplified Chinese is also used in Singapore and Malaysia and is 
the most popular Chinese writing system, worldwide. For our work 
in this research, we focused entirely on simplified Chinese. 
Chinese characters are derived from several hundred simple pic- 
tographs and ideographs in ways that are logical and easy to remem- 
ber. zigen are the atomic components of Chinese characters. Some 
zigen represents meaning, while other zigen represents pronunci- 
ation.  Unsurprisingly, Chinese characters sharing the same zigen 
usually have similar pronunciations or meanings. 
Interestingly, Chinese people take advantage of this to defeat keyword- 
based censorship, replacing one character in a word with another 
sharing a similar shape.  For example, “法 轮 功” (Falun Gong, a 
group which is broadly forbidden within China) is sometimes writ- 
ten as “法论功.” Making seemingly minor changes to the second 
character of the word yields a result that’s still perfectly legible to 
humans but can confuse automated censorship systems, at least un- 
til their human managers catch on. 
Characters form the basic unit of meaning in Chinese, but not 
all characters can stand alone as a word; most Chinese words are 
formed of two or more characters. For example, the word “中华人 
民共和国” (People’s Republic of China) is seven characters long 
and has smaller words within: “人民” (people) and “共和国” (re- 
public country). The first two characters,“中华” are usually not be 
used as a word independently in modern Chinese, though it can be 
used as a word in ancient Chinese. Digging further, within word “人 民” (people), “人” is a word (human), but “民” (civilian or folk) is 
not a standalone word. 
English speakers expect that words are separated by whitespace 
or punctuation.  In Chinese, however, words are simply concate- 
nated together.  Consequently, the problem of mechanically seg- 
menting Chinese text into its constituent words is a difficult prob- 
lem, and each search engine will necessarily employ different al- 
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gorithms and heuristics toward this problem. As another example, 
while the proper segmentation of “中华人民共和国外交部” (Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC) is “中华人民共和国 / 外交 
部”, another word, “国 外” (overseas), could also be erroneously 
extracted.  Consequently, a search for “国 外” should most likely 
not match the string “中华人民共和国外交部” but a query for “外 
交部” should. 
Of course, sometimes search engines get this wrong.   Search 
users are given something of an out by using quotation marks ex- 
plicitly when they search. Quotation marks around a string direct 
the search engine to find the precise quoted characters consecu- 
tively, regardless of their surrounding context, thus bypassing the 
normal segmentation process. See §4.2 for discussion and experi- 
mental measurements on quotation. 
 
3.   EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the functionality and 
the extent, we investigated Chinese Internet search engine result fil- 
tering. Some amount of censorship is immediately obvious; some 
search engines will literally announce that they are withholding re- 
sults.  Likewise, we can observe obvious effects like TCP reset 
packets arriving which kill our session when we make specific queries. 
We can also make differential comparisons across search engines, 
particularly when they are using the same underlying algorithms 
(e.g., Bing.com and cn.Bing.com can be expected to have similar 
or identical databases, as can Google.cn and Google.com). If one 
web site reports more hits than another for the same query, that’s 
indicative of censorship. 
Following this path of inquiry, we crawled roughly 45,000 dif- 
ferent keywords on four well-known search engine companies op- 
erating in China and their respective search websites: Baidu (Bai- 
du.com), Google (Google.com, Google.cn and Google.hk), Microsoft 
(Bing.com and cn.Bing.com) and Yahoo! (Yahoo.com and cn.Ya- 
hoo.com)1 . 
Baidu  (百 度, literally meaning “hundreds of times,” also repre- 
sents the persistent search for the ideal). Baidu is the most popular 
domestic search engine in China. 
Google  (谷歌, meaning “songs for millet or corn”). Before Google 
launched a Chinese local presence in February 2006, Google.com 
had been unavailable roughly 10% of the time [34].  In order to 
launch Google.cn, Google apparently agreed to remove “sensitive” 
information from their search results. Despite this, Google has never 
been the top search engine in China. They held roughly 30% of the 
market in 2009, which dropped to 26% in 2010, whereas Baidu’s 
market share increased from 69% to 73% over the same time pe- 
riod [19]. 
Yahoo!  (雅虎, meaning “elegant tiger”). Yahoo! China is not con- 
trolled by the U.S.-based Yahoo Inc. Instead Alibaba Group took 
control of Yahoo!  China as part of a 2005 deal with Yahoo.  Un- 
like Google or Microsoft, which keep confidential records of their 
users outside mainland China, Yahoo! China stated that the com- 
pany does not protect the privacy and confidentiality of its Chinese 
customers from the authorities [15]. Yahoo! China was prominent 
in China search engine market share in the early 2000’s, but it’s 
market share decreased rapidly from more then 40 percent in 2003 
to 0.3 percent in 2010 [18]. 
Bing  (必 应, meaning “must respond”) Microsoft launched Bing 
 
1 We also crawled www.goso.cn, a search engine belonging to the 
Chinese government.  However, our IP addresses were quickly 
blocked. Due to its apparent low market share in Chinese search, 
we decided to abandon its analysis for our current research. 
China’s beta version in June 2009. Bing has less than 1% of Chinese 
market share in 2010. 
To perform our experiments, we prepared word sets from which 
we form queries to searching engines. We build a crawler to visit 
the various search engines and make queries, and we build various 
analysis tools to extract the information we present later. 
 
3.1   Word sets 
All major search engines have rate limiting features, which re- 
quires us to be clever in how we design the set of queries we use for 
our experiments. If we use too many different words, then it will 
take too long between different instances of the same query. If we 
don’t use enough words, we might miss something noteworthy. 
As something of a control group, we need non-sensitive terms 
that are popularly used by Chinese Internet searchers.  Zhonggu- 
osou.com conveniently collects the most popular keywords user 
searched in Baidu.com and Google.cn [37]. In total, there are 66, 516 
words in this list, of which we use the first 44,102 words2 . We will 
later use the term General Words to refer to these words. 
We also add the word set which are known as sensitive words. 
Jedidiah et al.’s ConceptDoppler [8] discovered 133 specific words 
which are filtered in any HTTP GET request passing through the 
Great Firewall of China. We will later use the term ConceptDoppler 
to refer to these words. 
We also included a variety of terms that might have been inter- 
esting in the future, in the hopes that we would be able to observe 
censorship in action.  To that end, we used a list of 1,126 leaders 
within the Chinese government as well as the names of various Chi- 
nese government bodies and committees. We will later use the term 
Leader Name to refer to these words. 
Additionally, we gradually added new words which we thought 
might be interesting to test, based on headline news from current 
world events as our experiments progressed, ultimately ending up 
with 85 such terms. We will later use the term MyList  to refer to 
these words. 
Some words occur more than once in the above sets. Once merged 
together, there were a total of 45,411 different words in our word 
set. 
 
3.2   Crawler 
Our crawler program is straightforward.  The crawler takes a 
word from the word set, forms a query, sends it to a search engine, 
and saves the returned HTML file to local file system. We used the 
wget utility to simulate a web client, allowing us to automate the 
data collection process. We note that we generated a user-agent 
string from Firefox, working around some search engines that oth- 
erwise rejected our queries. Likewise, we had to properly manage 
the cookies set by some other search engines. 
Our work initially began in early 2010, using words from Gen- 
eral Words to probe for differences between Google.cn and Goo- 
gle.com.  We only recorded the number of hits reported for each 
query and otherwise deleted the HTML files that came back to us. 
After March 22, 2010, when Google killed Google.cn, we decided 
to become more systematic in our efforts, adding 5 more search 
engines (Baidu.com, cn.Bing.com, Bing.com, cn.Yahoo.com, Ya- 
hoo.com) to our experiments, increasing the word sets by adding 
ConceptDoppler, MyList and Leader Name, and saving the full 
HTML responses we received on each query.  We also conducted 
every query both with and without quotation marks around it (see 
§4.2). 
 
2 The remainder were accidentally missed due to a processing bug 
that we didn’t catch until fairly late in our analysis. Nonetheless, 
our sample is more than sufficient. 
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To deal with search engine rate limiting, we needed to limit our 
query rate. Of course, we could use multiple IP addresses, simul- 
taneously, since query throttling appears to be implemented on a 
per-IP-address basis, as far as we’ve seen it. Toward that end, we 
build a parallel crawler using 10 client PCs, each of which we al- 
lowed to have one outstanding query for each search engine.  All 
of this was controlled from a central machine which doled out the 
query tasks. Results were written the query machines’ local filesys- 
tems and later gathered together for analysis. 
We set different querying intervals for different search engines. 
With the servers of Baidu.com and cn.Yahoo.com being physically 
located in China, the network latency and throughput are much 
lower than we observed for other search engines. We found that we 
did not need to introduce artificial delays. Instead, for each crawler 
machine we could maintain one query to each engine, non-stop. 
Despite this, it still took about 20 hours for a full test trail for Bai- 
du.com and cn.Yahoo.com. 
Yahoo.com uses the most strict robot detecting mechanism among 
these seven search engines. Even sleeping for 5 seconds after every 
query, our IPs were still blocked after about 30 minutes. Rather than 
stretching the sleep interval even farther, we instead sent queries se- 
quentially, without delays, until we were blocked. Then we waited 
to be unblocked and resumed our crawling. Overall, this strategy 
required 11 days for a full crawl of our data set. 
For Bing.com, cn.Bing.com, Google.com, and Google.hk, we 
settled on using a random sleep interval ranging from 0.7 to 2.2 
seconds between each query. A full test trail for Google.com, Goo- 
gle.hk, Bing.com, or cn.Bing.com is about 10 hours. Bing.com and 
cn.Bing.com used to have weaker anti-crawling feature, but these 
were upgraded in November 2010. We originally could query our 
entire data set in an hour. 
In the process of implementing our crawler, a variety of different 
things could go wrong that we needed to detect and manage. We 
group the errors into four classes: 
 
TCP Reset. This appears to be caused by the Golden Shield Project, 
colloquially called the Great Firewall of China (GFC), and 
is triggered by querying sensitive words.  With wget, these 
TCP reset packets usually manifest themselves with “Read 
Error (connection reset by peer)” or “Read Error (Connection 
timed out)”. Typically, the GFC then blocks all communica- 
tion from our IP address to the search engine for roughly 90 
seconds.  When we get in this state, we pause ten seconds 
then query once every ten subsequent seconds with a “Hello 
world” query until we either get through or get a different 
error. TSP reset errors happen mostly to cn.Yahoo.com, but 
they also happen to Baidu.com with a much lower frequency. 
(More details in §4.4.) 
 
HTTP error. When Yahoo detects us as a robot and wishes to throt- 
tle us, it sends back “ERROR 999: Unable to process request 
at this time”.  We stop for 5 minutes before testing again 
with a “Hello, world” query.  When Google detects us as a 
robot, it sends back “503 Service Unavailable”. As before, 
we fall back and retry with a “Hello, world” query until we 
get through. 
 
HTML error. For Baidu and Bing, when they detect us as a robot, 
they do not return an HTTP error code. Instead, they return 
an HTML page with suitably apologetic text. These HTML 
pages changed on a regular basis during our experiments, re- 
quiring us to make suitable modifications to the crawler. 
 
Timeout. These happened for reasons that we cannot diagnose. We 
treated timeouts as temporary errors, waited ten seconds, then 
attempted a “Hello, world” query to ensure that everything 
was working again. 
 
If any of these error conditions occur, we fall back to making 
sure out “Hello, world” query succeeds and then we retry the query 
that induced the error. We try up to 3 times before we give up on a 
keyword. 
Naturally, there were many unpredictable difficulties during the 
experiments.  For example, different search engines use different 
encoding system for Chinese characters, and the encoding systems 
are not same with the return pages and the queries. cn.Yahoo.com 
return the results in UTF-8, however the query has to be encoded 
in GB18030. Similarly, Baidu.com returns the results in the form of 
GB2312, however, we have to send our query in GB18030. cn.Bing.com, 
Google.hk and Google.cn use UTF-8 in both results and queries. 
 
3.3 Analyzer 
Our analyzer is designed to parse the HTML files returned by our 
crawler, making use of Beautiful Soup, a Python library for pars- 
ing XML-style documents. In sum, we collected one terrabyte of 
HTML files (uncompressed). We parallelized our analyzer, running 
on 16 CPUs, and the full computation took roughly 100 hours to run, 
dumping the resulting data into a MySQL database which we can 
more easily process. 
In the process of debugging our analyzer, we had to deal with the 
ever-changing layout of the various search engines’ pages as well 
as a variety of transient error conditions. Many errors only became 
apparent when trying to understand strange artifacts in our graphs. 
 
4. DETECTION METHODS 
We now describe several different measurement experiments and 
our findings.  Table 1 summarizes how many different measure- 
ments we made of each search engine, where one measurement cor- 
responds to queries made to that engine for each word in our corpus. 
Numbers in parentheses count how many measurements we made 
before Google terminated Google.cn. 
 
4.1 Hit ratios 
When a user queries a search engine, the search engine typically 
says how many results match the query (see Figure 1). This is true 
for every major search engine. Our hypothesis is that this number 
may be useful as a way of measuring search engine censorship. 
Of course, the number of hits for a given query is not meaning- 
ful in and of itself. However, the same query sent to two different 
search engines will allow us to measure a hit ratio. In a world with- 
out any censorship, we would expect this ratio to be roughly 1.0, 
regardless of query, assuming the two search engines use the same 
underlying database or underlying codebase. Of course, there will 
be noise in these measurements. We have observed a 10% varia- 
tion in these results in repeated queries for the same term, even for 
identical queries made within minutes of one another to the same 
search engine.  Likewise, we can imagine that there will be some 
variation in search results that are a function purely of the way the 
search engine processes Chinese-language queries. 
Censorship could manifest itself on the input to a search engine 
via its crawler, perhaps a result of the crawler being forced to view 
the Internet through the Great Firewall of China. Censorship could 
also manifest itself on the output of a search engine via internal 
policing.  If a crawler were censored as it gathered its data, then 
the number of results reported would necessarily be lower. If cen- 
sorship was implemented internally, a search engine could perhaps 
present the full number of results yet quietly fail to return matching 
results. 
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Table 1: Experimental measurement runs: how many times each corpus of words were queried against each search engine. 
    Words 
list 
Number Google Google Google Baidu Bing Cn.Bing Yahoo Cn.Yahoo
of words .com .cn .hk .com .com .com .com .com 
No 
quotation 
marks 
General Words
Leader Name 
ConceptDoppler 
MyList 
44102 19 (4) (5) 18 3 6 6 2 2
1126 21 - 20 3 6 6 2 2 
133 21 (2) (3) 20 3 6 6 2 2 
85 7 - 6 3 4 4 2 2 
With 
quotation 
marks 
General Words
Leader Name 
ConceptDoppler 
MyList 
44102 19 (3) (3) 18 17 23 23 12 15
1126 21 - 20 18 23 23 14 17 
133 21 (3) (3) 20 18 23 23 15 16 
85 7 - 7 6 7 7 5 5 
  
hello, world Search 
 
About 37,600,000 results (0.10 seconds) 
 
Advanced search  
Everything 
Images 
Videos 
News 
Shopping 
Discussions 
More 
 
Hello world program - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia  
A "Hello world" program is a computer program that prints out 
"Hello world" on a display device. It is typically one of the simplest 
programs possible in ... 
Purpose - History - Variations - Other appearances 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hello_world_program - Cached - Similar 
Hello-World: World Languages for Children of all  ages   
Games, songs and activities make learning any language fun. 
www.hello-world.com/ - Cached - Similar 
 
Figure 1: All search engines report an approximate number of 
pages matching a given query. Here, Google reports just over 37 
million occurrences of the phrase “hello, world” on the Internet. 
 
 
We have also observed differences, for example, in the way that 
English and Chinese-language versions of the same search engine 
segment Chinese words for queries. Furthermore, the English-language 
search engines, given Chinese characters for a query, will some- 
times match Japanese-language pages, since some Chinese charac- 
ters also show up in Japanese writing. This doesn’t happen with the 
Chinese-language search engines. 
Consequently, we expect that hit ratios will be a noisy signal, 
with a variety of reasons other than censorship which might induce 
ratios that are notably lower or greater than one. Regardless, as we 
will now show, hit ratios provide a valuable window into the world 
of search engine censorship. 
 
4.1.1   Google 
We performed are five sets of measurements from August 2009 
to March 2010, when Google ultimately shut down Google.cn. Fig- 
ure 2 shows cn/com ratios for querying our corpus against Google, 
without use of quotation marks. Each dot in the picture is a specific 
search term.  Five different colors are used for the five different 
measurement sets. We sorted the results based on the cn/com ratio 
(lowest to highest) and the x-axis position is the location in this list. 
The y-axis position, in log-scale, indicates the cn/com ratio. Since 
the rank ordering of the ratios would be different on each measure- 
ment run, we ordered all the results based on the median cn/ com 
ratio. Thus, each of the five points in a given column represent five 
queries for the same word at different times. Also, we plotted the 
median cn/com ratio. 
This plot indicates something of a fuzzy band between the cn/ 
com ratios of 0.1 and 10.0 for the vast majority of queries. We see 
a similar effect in other measurements. This seems to indicate that 
ratio differences within a factor of ten in either direction are not 
a significant indicator of tampered results.  Instead, these are the 
results of the many other factors (see §4.1 for some possibilities). 
Figure 2:   cn/ com hit ratio for Google (no quotation) over 
five different measurements of our word set from August 2009 
through March 2010. 
  
Figure 3:  cn/ com hit ratio for Google (with quotation) over 
three different measurements of our word set from January 
2010 through March 2010. 
   
Despite this, there are clear “tails” on both sides of the graph. 
We’re particularly interested in the search queries with the lowest 
ratios; the lowest is for “柴 玲” (Chai Ling, one of the leaders of 
the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989). Google.cn reports a grand 
total of 34 hits for her, while Google.com reports 230,000 hits (a 
ratio of 0.00014). Unsurprisingly, Chai Ling is widely censored in 
China. When we examined the other searches with a cn/com ratio 
lower than 0.1, they were generally either political or pornographic 
in nature. The “boundary” where censored terms start running into 
the noise is roughly around word #66 in the list, at which the ratio is 
roughly 0.12. We present these numbers, and those for other search 
engines, in Table 2, columns A through D. 
We also conducted three sets of measurements against Google.cn 
and Google.com using quotation marks around our search terms, as 
an experiment to see whether there was a meaningful difference 
between that and unquoted searches. We used a subset of 10,000 
words from the General Words set.  The cn/ com ratio is plotted 
in Figure 3. This data has a similar shape to the non-quoted search 
terms, so we present it here. One notable difference between quoted 
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and non-quoted searches for the same terms is that we did not see 
any differences in searches for pornographic terms. (Does this mean 
that Chinese users of Google.cn could get around porn censorship 
by using quotation marks around their searches? We, unfortunately, 
can’t go back and try more variations on this to see what was going 
on.) Issues surrounding data quotation are discussed further in §4.2. 
We also decided to look at the search terms on the other side of 
the graph, where Google.cn reported more search results than Goo- 
gle.com. There was no discernable pattern to these words. As far as 
we can tell, these terms’ higher Google.cn hit rates was the result of 
minor or inconsequential differences between Google.cn and Goo- 
gle.com. 
Google hk/ com.   When Google terminated Google.cn in March 
2010, they relocated the simplified Chinese service to Google.hk 
alongside the Traditional Chinese service which had already been 
there.  Google claim that, unlike Google.cn, Google.hk would no 
longer be subject to censorship. We began measuring the simplified 
Chinese version of Google.hk following the same methodology we 
used with Google.cn.  
  
Figure 4: hk/com ratio for Google (no quotation) over 25 data 
sets from May 2010 to February 2011 
  
Figure 5: hk/com ratio for Google (with quotation) over 25 data 
sets from May 2010 to February 2011  
The hk/com ratio and the median over all 25 measurements are 
plotted in graphs Figure 4 and Figure 5. Unlike the Google.cn data, 
the tail on the left side of the graph, minimizing the hk/com ratio, 
contains no particularly interesting words, with or without the use 
of quotation marks. Our results are thus consistent with an absence 
of externally-imposed censorship. 
We note that Google.hk has no option to disable Google’s Safe 
Search which is always “strict”. When we used pornographic search 
terms with Google.hk, it returns a page explicitly saying “The word 
has been filtered from the search because Google SafeSearch is ac- 
tive.”  Also, no hit numbers are available for those search terms. 
For Google.com we left the default setting, which is “moderate”, 
for our comparisons with Google.hk. 
The right-side tails, when hk/com is maximized, turn out to be 
mostly pornographic words for both sets of measurements. We be- 
lieve this difference is due to the different ways that the different 
search engines treat pornographic terms.  Google.hk, apparently, 
will take a term like “强 奸 犯” (rapist) and remove the first two 
characters (强 奸, rape) doing a query on the last character, alone 
(犯, convict), thus yielding a larger number of results. In contrast, 
Google.com strictly searches on the more limited three-character 
term. 
 
4.1.2   Yahoo! 
For our analysis of Yahoo!, we only present results captured prior 
to August 2010, when yahoo.com abandoned its internal search en- 
gine in favor of Microsoft’s Bing. 
Figure 6 is the plot of cn/ com ratio for Yahoo!  before August 
2010.  Here we only show the results for queries using quotation 
marks. The distribution is clearly different from what we observed 
with Google. There are two relatively flat areas in the chart. One 
is around ratio of 0.1, another is between 10 to 100, with a notable 
discontinuity around the middle of our data set. In short, there are 
some terms where cn.Yahoo.com clearly dominates Yahoo.com and 
there are other terms where Yahoo.com clearly dominates cn.Ya- 
hoo.com. This leads us to believe that these search engines don’t 
share much in the way of common infrastructure. 
 
  
Figure 6: cn/com ratio for Yahoo! (with quotation) over 8 data 
sets from May to August 2010. 
 
Many of the queries with the lowest cn/com ratio turn out to be 
pornographic terms.  Interestingly, we observed that the character 
“” (meaning color or pornographic) is a particular focus of cen- 
sorship attention from cn.Yahoo.com. Of the 120 words with that 
character in our corpus, 92 words have ratios lower than 0.1, 22 
words between 0.1 to 0.3, and 6 words have rations of 0.3 to 0.86. 
The bulk of these words are not pornographic terms in any fashion 
at all. We hypothesize that the engineers of cn.Yahoo.com took on 
the relatively simplistic approach of filtering the all the keywords 
which contain this character, regardless of any collateral damage. 
To comfirm this theory, we looked for other characters in our that 
tend to show up in pornographic words:  “插” (insert), “女” (fe- 
male), and “射” (shoot/ejaculate). These characters, regardless of 
the actual word using them, all appear to induce cn.Yahoo.com to 
fall back to a relatively small set of web sites for its results. This 
leads us to hypothesize that cn.Yahoo.com implements a fallback 
strategy: any query that might possibly have sensitive results will 
only return web sites from a known-safe white list. We discuss this 
further in §5.1. 
 
4.1.3   Bing 
The cn/com method when applied to Bing (comparing Bing.com 
with cn.Bing.com) yields a plot that’s quite similar to our compari- 
son of Google.com and Google.hk. (To save space, we don’t show 
it here.)  This leads us to believe, unsurprisingly, that Bing.com 
and cn.Bing.com use the same underlying search engine. Examin- 
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ing the words with cn/com ratio divergent from 1.0, at both ends, 
we could not find any particular pattern.  But as we will discuss 
in §4.3, cn.Bing.com shows “removed results” banner message for 
many words, which explicitly tells users that censorship has been 
applied.  Since the hit numbers are unchanged but censorship is 
clearly present on cn.Bing.com, either the number of censored pages 
is too small to measure, or the reported hit numbers on cn.Bing.com 
are simply inaccurate. 
 
4.2   Quotation comparison 
As we have discussed before, Chinese search engines, much like 
their English counterparts, behave differently when a query is put 
inside quotation marks.  For example, Google’s help page offers 
that, “by putting double quotes around a set of words, you are telling 
Google to consider the exact words in that exact order without any 
change.” 
For Chinese search engines, double quotes have a similar func- 
tion, telling the search engine to consider the exact characters in the 
exact order. This is true for Google.hk and cn.Bing.com, But not 
always true for Baidu.com and cn.Yahoo.com. For example if you 
search for “共和国中华人民” (a reordering of the characters for 
“People’s Republic of China”), in quotation marks, Baidu.com and 
cn.Yahoo.com will still return results for “中华人民共和国” (the 
proper spelling), but with fewer total results than you might get for 
the proper spelling. 
Since the treatment of quotation marks around a strong clearly 
changes the results, we thought we should try quotation marks against 
our corpus to see whether sensitive words are treated differently 
when quoted. With this, we can both compare a Chinese and non- 
Chinese search engine (e.g., Google.cn vs. Google.com, as before) 
and we can also compare a search engine against itself. 
 
4.2.1   Google.cn 
Figure 7 shows the ratio of hit number of non-quotes vs. quotes 
for Google.cn.  Though we only have two measurement sets for 
Google.cn, this graph clearly demonstrates that most searches yield 
comparable results (a ratio near 1.0).  Only 188 words out of our 
whole set had a ratio < 0.9. 
 
  
Figure 7: Non-quotation vs. quotation hit ratio for Google.cn 
over two data sets in March 2010. 
 
The top 50 and next 100 low-ratio words from Google.cn are cat- 
egorized in Table 2 in column E and F. The numbers in parentheses 
are the number of words with 4 or more characters. Our measure- 
ments show that sensitive words, mostly pornographic, were filtered 
from regular Google.cn results but appeared when they were in quo- 
tation marks. 
In contrast, for Google.com and Google.hk, the top words were 
not especially sensitive.  What did jump out were Chinese four- 
character idioms (typically bits of folk wisdom, or common sayings; 
English has many comparable sayings, e.g., “The early bird gets 
the worm.”). Common Chinese idioms, when quoted, yield more 
search results than when they’re not quoted.  61% of the top 100 
ratios in Google.com and 69% of the top 100 ratios in Google.hk 
correspond to the prevalence of these Chinese idioms.  Querying 
for common English sayings on Google.com and Google.hk, we 
observed similar results. When they are quoted, Google.com and 
Google.hk yield more search results than when they’re not quoted. 
We won’t attempt to understand why this effect is so significant, 
but it’s clearly a common feature of Google search engines which 
is not specifically designed for the Chinese language and appears to 
be unrelated to any form of censorship. 
 
4.2.2   Baidu.com 
For Baidu, there are 83 words whose non-quotation/ quotations 
hit ratio is lower then 1.0. We categorize these words in Table 2 in 
column G. We saw a split among pornographic terms, Tiananmen 
Square terms, and various important Chinese leaders and their rela- 
tives. In total, 82% of these specific words are sensitive. For the 83 
words in question, Baidu’s censorship filters clearly behaved dif- 
ferently. We discuss these terms further in §4.3, when we discuss 
search engines that explicitly disclose they’ve removed censored 
results from any given query result. 
 
4.3   Removed Results Message 
Every search engine we investigated will sometimes show a mes- 
sage which states that there are messages removed from the re- 
sults when a search query would otherwise lead to a censored page. 
cn.Yahoo.com notably stands out by always saying “According to 
relevant laws, regulations and policies, some search results may not 
appear.”  (根 据 有 关 法 律 法 规 和 政 策， 部 分 搜 索 结 果 可 能 未 
予 显 示。) regardless of the search query.  Consequently, cn.Ya- 
hoo.com gives us no useful information about when it does and 
doesn’t censor its results, but we learn something from the presence 
or absence of such a message on other search engines. 
For Google.com, Google.hk and Bing.com, we found that none 
of the queries in our corpus would trigger such messages. For Goo- 
gle.cn, however, it was easy to trigger this information. Even query- 
ing for something innocuous like “你 好” (hello), Google.cn in- 
formed us that one of the search results had been removed from 
the 10th page of search results (at 10 items per page). From this, 
we can conclude that Google.cn’s index tagged all web pages with 
whether or not they’re sensitive, rather than removing them entirely 
from the index. 
 
4.3.1   Baidu 
Unlike Google.cn, Baidu.com displays its “removed results” ban- 
ner message as the first line of the first page of search results, regard- 
less of how deep the censored search results may be. Furthermore, 
there is never such a message on the second or subsequent search 
results pages. 
In our measurements with quotation marks, we found 35 words 
leading to a visible indication of censorship. In our measurements 
without quotation marks, we found 120 words leading to the same 
indication.  This is consistent with our earlier results (see §4.2), 
where quoting search terms results in larger result sets. This seems 
to indicate that Baidu.com has two passes of censorship: one when 
the results to a query are first generated, and a second when the user 
tries to actually dig into the search results and see them. Table 2, in 
columns J and K, breaks down Baidu.com’s censorship by type of 
query. 
 
4.3.2   Bing 
cn.Bing.com appears to take a similar censorship strategy to Goo- 
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gle.cn, as described above. Our experiments fetched the first 50 top 
hits for every word for each query, so our quantitative results are 
based on whether censorship appears in these top 50 hits. We would 
not observe censorship of lower-ranked search results. 
First, for a subset of the words in our queries, we saw the “re- 
moved results” string every time, while for other words we only 
sometimes saw the “removed results” string. Table 2, columns H 
and I, reports statistics on the words that always have some censor- 
ship reported. 
Also, we observed that roughly half (20,000 out of 45,000) of 
our queries gave search results which triggered page removal mes- 
sages at least once among all of the trials for each given query. 
These correspond to approximate 38%, 32%, 88% and 74%, of the 
queries from the General Words, Leader Name, ConceptDoppler 
and MyList word sets, respectively. Unsurprisingly, word sets with 
more sensitive terms (ConceptDoppler and MyList) have a higher 
incidents of removed search results. 
 
4.4   TCP reset 
It’s a standard practice for the GFC to snoop on TCP traffic, look- 
ing for undesired keywords. Its standard practice, when it sees such 
things, is to forge TCP reset packets to both sides of the connection, 
but it doesn’t happen consistently. 
One keyword that does result in a consistent, nearly 100% cer- 
tain reset rate is the term “falun” in the standard Latin alphabet, not 
the equivalent Chinese characters. This happens regardless of the 
web site inside China that we might try to connect to, even gov- 
ernment web sites. Perhaps they’re more concerned with the term 
“falun” inbound to their country than they are with where, exactly, 
it’s going. 
Not all sensitive words have such a high reset rate as “falun”. 
There are two search engines, inside the GFC that we can query 
from the outside, and their TCP reset behavior is different. 
 
4.4.1   Baidu 
We found 6 other words which consistently caused TCP resets 
when we sent them as queries to Baidu.com: 
章沁生 Zhang QinSheng, recently promoted to a full general of the 
army. 
彭小枫 Peng XiaoFeng, a full general of the army. 
天葬 Sky burial, a Tibetan funerary practice. 
我的奋斗 Mein Kampf, by Adolf Hitler, a book that’s banned in- 
side China. 
王斌余 Wang Binyu, a Chinese migrant laborer executed for mur- 
der. 
盛雪 Sheng Xue, a Chinese pro-democracy activist, journalist, and 
actress, currently living in Canada. 
 
It is unknown to us why GFC resets these specific six words on 
Baidu. (These data are also summarized in Table 2, column L.) 
 
4.4.2   Yahoo! 
Among the words we tested, we found 102 words which caused 
TCP resets at least twice when sending them as queries to cn.Ya- 
hoo.com. Almost all of them are political sensitive words includ- 
ing terms related to the Tiananmen Square protests, Falun Gong, 
dissidents’ names, and various Chinese dissident / pro-democracy 
organizations.  Only three pornographic or obscene terms caused 
TCP resets.  (These data are also summarized in Table 2, column 
M.) 
Why is cn.Yahoo.com treated differently than Baidu.com?  We 
conjecture that Baidu has implemented stronger internal censorship 
controls, or at least has convinced its government regulators that it 
has, and therefore Baidu has less overt restrictions placed on it by 
the GFC. 
 
5.   OTHER ANALYSES 
In addition to our automated queries, we conducted a handful of 
manual experiments that helped us develop theories to explain how 
Chinese search engines implement their censorship behavior. 
 
5.1   Sensitivity of different terms 
Our search engine studies found clear evidence of censorship 
from search engines inside China (Google.cn, Baidu.com, and cn.Ya- 
hoo.com) as well confirming other studies of GFC censorship. In 
this next section, we consider several specific sensitive terms and 
what this might say for the structure that the Chinese government 
may be requiring for internal search engines. 
We queried “法轮功” (Falun Gong) at Google.cn and Google.com 
on March 20, 2010.  Google.cn reported 16,900 hits versus Goo- 
gle.com’s 880,000 hits (a 2% ratio). We then visited each web page 
returned by Google.cn in its first 20 results. Every page could be 
characterized as negative to Falun Gong. Furthermore, the top 100 
hit results were from less than 20 unique top-level domains, each of 
which appears to be directly controlled by the Chinese government 
(e.g., people.com.cn, cctv.com,  xinhuanet.com and china.com. 
cn). This suggests a “white list” policy for sensitive terms. When 
a search engine is given a sensitive query, it may only be permitted 
to return officially sanctioned results. 
We also believe there to be a “second-class white list” of web 
sites, which have lower priority than those in “white list” but higher 
priority than other general web sites. For example when we search 
for pornography related terms on Google.cn, the resulting web sites 
are not limited to the “white list” sites we see elsewhere, but are still 
limited to a variety of govenment controled web sites. 
We also believe there to be a “black list”. These web sites may 
not be shown in search results under any circumstances. This was 
easy to validate. We visited epochtimes.com, the official home- 
page for Falun Gong, which is certainly censored within China. We 
extracted a specific sentence which we then fed to various search en- 
gines. Google.com found this sentence precisely three times, while 
Google.cn found it twice. The two common records were the same. 
The absent record was from epochtimes.com. 
We observed the same white list phenomena in cn.Yahoo.com. 
80 of the top-level domains of the first 100 returned results (fetched 
in May 2010) for the keyword “颜 色” (“color” in English, and 
misjudged by cn.Yahoo.com to be a sensitive keyword, as we dis- 
cussed in §4.1.2), are from exactly two top-level domains: ce.cn 
and china.com.cn. The other 20 hits include gb.cri.cn, chinadaily. 
com.cn, people.com.cn, xinhuanet.com and cctv.com, all of which 
belong to the Chinese government. For “屁眼” (“asshole” in En- 
glish), measured in February 2011, cn.Yahoo.com returned 184 hits. 
Again, all of the top-level domains for the first 100 search results 
were from the above sites. We can safely conclude that these are all 
white-listed for cn.Yahoo.com. As an aside, we also observed that, 
some time in late 2010, cn.Yahoo.com improved their system such 
that many incorrectly sensitive words, such as “颜 色” (color), are 
no longer treated as sensitive. Regardless, even today, we observe 
that cn.Yahoo.com still serves up results from the same white list 
whenever queried with a sensitive word. 
Baidu.com also appears to have a broader white list than cn.Ya- 
hoo.com. 
We finally consider whether Baidu.com, cn.Bing.com, and cn.Ya- 
hoo.com have comparable black list behavior to what we saw with 
Google.cn. We queried the same sentence from epochtimes.com 
as we originally tried with Google.cn. Baidu.com returned exactly 
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Table 2: Classification of the most censored words for different types of search engine analyses. 
    cn/com ratio Quotation Removed Result Message Reset
Google Google.cn Baidu cn.Bing.com Baidu Baidu cn.Yahoo
no quote quoting quoting no quote quoting no quote 
Word range 
Ratio 
1-66  67-100 1-15  16-100 1-50 51-100 1-83 1-53 1-59 1-35 1-120 1-6 1-102
<0.12  <0.137  <0.042  <0.546  <0.145 <0.33 < 1 - - - - - -
Pornography 
Tiananmen Sq.
Falun Gong 
Leaders 
Politics 
- 
34 5 0 2 30(1) 15 28 1 7 2 47 0 3
14 0 10 4 4 1 14 18 11 11 22 0 35
5 0 3 1 1 0 2 8 8 3 5 0 11
2 1 0 4 1 6 21 3 2 17 39 2 6
7 1 2 4 2 1 3 11 6 1 6 4 44
4 27 0 70 12(6) 28(4) 15 12 25 2 1 0 3
Total 
Percent1 
66 34 15 85 50 50 83 53 59 36 120 6 102
94% 21% 100% 18% 76% 44% 82% 77% 58% 94% 99% 100% 97%
Column Name A B C D E F G H I J K L M
1  Percent = Number of words in the five sensitive categories (Pornography, Tiananmen Sq., Falun Gong, Leaders and Poltics) / Total ×100%. 
  
one result, and it was from a non-governmental gamers’ web site 
in Taiwan. There were only two hit results in cn.Yahoo.com, both 
from Buddhism forum within China. The article there containing 
the quoted sentence and was critical of Falun Gong. We could not 
observe the presence of black list in cn.Bing.com, which did link us 
back to the original source of the sentence on epochtimes.com. 
5.2   Temporal variation 
We are interested in how search engine responses to sensitive 
queries change over time as well as how the behavior of the GFC 
changes over time.  Clearly, comparing the number of hits for a 
given keyword is unlikely to be of much use, both due to the high 
variance or noise in hit counts, and due to the fact that search en- 
gines index new pages and update themselves on an ongoing basis. 
On the other hand, the TCP reset behavior of the GFC would likely 
be relatively stable over time, or at least between points when the 
administration makes adjustments. 
TCP resets.   In cn.Yahoo.com, during our experiments, we saw 
184 different words trigger at least one TCP reset from the GFC. As 
we discussed earlier, there was some unpredictability in the GFC’s 
behavior, but there were no clear trends visible in our data with one 
exception. For the measurements we performed on September 15, 
2010, the GFC was notably less restrictive than on any other day 
in our data collection. We have no particular theory to explain why 
the GFC might have behaved differently on this one day. 
Omitting the anomalous September 15, 2010 measurement, the 
only word whose reset rate was particularly notable for having a 
variable reset rate was “滕文生” (Teng Wensheng), a Chinese Com- 
munity Party “think tank” researcher.  Among our measurements 
from June 8, 2010 through February 21, 2011, his name triggered re- 
set response continually in 4 sampling periods in August and Septem- 
ber and did not trigger reset response before and after this period. 
This only happened when connecting to cn.Yahoo.com, not Baidu. 
We have no particular theory to explain this anomaly. (Maybe he’s 
more important than we might have otherwise thought.) 
Removed results.  §4.3 demonstrated that this is an efficient method 
to detect sensitive words. Can this method also tell us some infor- 
mation about time trends? 
Baidu.com notably gives us one bit of information (censored re- 
sults within or not) as part of the initial result from a search query. 
This makes it easier to track trends over time than with other search 
engines where we would need to dig deeper in the search results to 
identify the presence of censored results.  Among our full dataset 
of Baidu queries, there were 35 words that had censored results at 
least once. Among these 35 words, 26 words had censored results 
every time.  The remained 9 words, described in Table 3, may be 
useful for measuring changes in censorship over time. 
  
Table 3: Trigger Removed Result Message Ratio in Baidu.com 
Word Censorship Total Ratio 
(in English) Observed Observations 
Li Peng 16 18 0.89 
Wen Jiabao 12 17 0.71 
Zhang Dejiang 6 18 0.33 
Chai Ling 6 18 0.33 
Nobel Peace Prize 1 3 0.33 
Month 5 17 0.29 
Year Month 4 17 0.24 
Zhou Xiaochuan 4 18 0.22 
Adult 2 17 0.12 
 
Let’s take “温家宝” (Wen Jiabao, the current prime minister of 
China) as an example. In our first five measurements (in June 2010), 
queries of “温家宝” did not trigger any notice of censorship, which 
means that, during this period, 温家宝 was not in Baidu.com’s cen- 
sorship list.  However, in the 12 subsequent measurements (from 
July 2010 through February 2011), “温家宝” queries always indi- 
cated the presence of censorship. While we do not know what pages 
related to the prime minister might be subject to censorship, we do 
have a stable signal that censorship is being applied. We might then 
dig deeper to sort out what, exactly, has changed. 
 
6.   RELATED WORK 
External evaluation of search engines does not require privileged 
access to any search engine’s database or on specific knowledge of 
how the search engines work, and consequently many have stud- 
ied them.  In their first paper using external evaluation of search 
engines Bharat and Broder [3] picked pages uniformly at random 
from the index of a particular engine. They measured relative sizes 
and the overlaps of search engine indices through random queries. 
Bar-Yossef and Gurevich [1] published a more detailed study along 
similar lines, focusing on decreasing the biases during sampling. 
In later work [2] , they measured global quality metrics of search 
engines, like corpus size, index freshness and density of duplicates 
in the corpus. Vaughan [32] also evaluated search engine ranking 
quality and stability. 
Our work is specifically focused on Internet censorship, which 
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has also been studied, particularly with regard to the Great Fire- 
wall of China (GFC). The ConceptDoppler project [8] provides a 
“censorship weather report” by detecting the synthetic TCP reset 
packets, tracking which words are blocked when they are detected 
in TCP streams. Park and Crandall [25] investigated the distributed 
nature of the filtering of HTTP responses in China. They showed a 
low disconnection successful rate (<51%) when the censor detected 
a keyword and attempted to reset the connection. Clayton et al. [6, 
7], studied the hybrid blocking system deployed by British Telecom 
in the United Kingdom to block access to pedophile websites and 
also investigated the GFC. Wolfgarten [35] studied filtering situa- 
tion in China and also showed some bypass techniques. Wang [34], 
compared the search return results from China with the results from 
New Zealand, similar to our own methodology, but with only 200 
English keywords. And, of course, a wide variety of technical coun- 
termeasures to the GFC and other sources of censorship have been 
designed and deployed, most notably Tor [9]. Likewise, a wide va- 
riety of peer-to-peer networks have been proposed with censorship- 
resistant and/or anonymization properties (see, e.g., [30, 12, 22, 23, 
13, 27]). 
Besides computer scientists, Internet censorship also attract at- 
tention from other fields.  MacKinnon [21] studied how Chinese 
blog services censor their bloggers. Zittrain and Edelman [38] in- 
vestigated Internet filtering methods and collected lists of sites blocked 
by China. Other studies have been conducted by a variety of public 
interest organizations including Global Internet Freedom Consor- 
tium [14], Human Rights Watch [17], Villenevue [33], and Reports 
Without Borders [31]. 
 
7.   CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
From our experiments and analysis, we can now conclude: 
 
• The Chinese government does not necessarily make unam- 
biguous censorship requirements of search engine companies, 
although we have seen evidence of a “black list” that they 
must follow. 
• Search engine companies appear to decide, on their own, how 
they might perform censorship. The terms which are filtered 
and the precise methodology with which they are filtered clearly 
vary across the different search engines, but there are clear 
topic areas that are always subject to censorship:  political 
activists and their organizations, particularly anything to do 
with the Tiananmen Square protests or Falun Gong. 
• Some search engines maintain “white lists” of web sites that 
are considered “safe” for responses to any blacklisted search 
query. 
• Chinese search engines also aggressively filter pornographic 
terms, although their strategies toward doing this vary and are 
not necessarily very sophisticated. 
• Non-Chinese-language search engines also implement anti- 
pornography filtering, but not political censorship when given 
queries in Chinese languages. 
• The Great Firewall of China mainly blocks connections when 
it sees political sensitive terms. Rather than a once-size-fits- 
all policy, different services within China are subject to dif- 
fering levels of blocking. 
• The methodologies introduced in this paper may help users to 
recognize a term being censored. Users can exploit a variety 
of telltale signs to, at the very least, know with certainty that 
they are looking at unnaturally filtered search engine results. 
• Censored search terms are often treated differently when queried 
within double quotation marks. This may be a partial mitiga- 
tion against some search engine censorship. 
Overall, we demonstrated a variety of straightforward techniques 
and measurements that can be used to quantify Chinese Internet cen- 
sorship. Of course, if China wished, it would be straightforward for 
its search engines to hide many of the features that we used.  Hit 
counts could be falsified. Censorship within a given query need not 
be reported. Unfortunately, this makes our results too fragile to be 
of much use to Chinese citizens wishing to overcome search engine 
censorship. 
Regardless, we see a variety of interesting challenges for future 
work. For example, we could conduct a far more invasive compar- 
ison of search results between, for example, Google.com and Bai- 
du.com, looking at the size of the set intersection of their top 1000 
results or other such comparison metrics.  Such an analysis, con- 
ducted at higher frequency and for a deeper list of queries, would 
require a much larger network of computers to capture the data and 
analyze the results. Among other things, we would certainly need 
a larger pool of IP addresses to avoid search engines’ query rate 
limiting and to overcome the inevitable IP blacklisting we would 
experience. 
With a deeper and more frequent set of queries, we could have 
perhaps been able to have detailed traces leading up to an important 
political event, such as the recent detainment of Chinese artist and 
political dissident Ai Weiwei. Likewise, we might have been able 
to observe the presence or absence of censorship of news from other 
countries where the governments are under duress (e.g., Libya and 
Syria) or have been overthrown (e.g., Tunisia and Egypt). If censor- 
ship policies turn out to be adjusted in advance of other government 
actions, that would be a very valuable signal. 
Of course, being able to measure Chinese Internet censorship 
from the outside, or to measure the censorship of many other coun- 
tries with comparably restricted Internet access, is of only limited 
utility to the citizens inside those countries. Still, we did find one 
time when the Great Firewall briefly dropped its guard. If we could 
effectively and efficiently identify these opportunities, for the lim- 
ited durations when they may exist, this could lead to pointed ac- 
tion, directed toward arranging external content to most effectively 
communicate to those on the inside, reaching out to learn more. 
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